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ABSTRACT 
Firm’s pursuing entrepreneurial rents often face challenges such as risk, uncertainty, and limited 
resources. Our paper lays out insights from three theoretical perspectives, the resource-based 
view, dynamic capabilities, and game theory, to illustrate how coopetition can be a significant 
source of value creation in this context. We suggest that the types of resources most relevant for 
value creation are often held by competitors, who are servicing similar customers and confronting 
similar challenges. This facilitates access to complementary resources where internal 
development is time-consuming or costly. In addition, competitors can use each other’s knowledge 
and resource flow to extend and upgrade resources in dynamic environments. This enables 
positive-sum outcomes that exceed the sum-total of value creation efforts if pursued independently. 
Our paper illuminates underpinning value creating mechanisms in coopetition, demonstrates 
unique benefits that may be exclusively available to entrepreneurial firms, and underscores the 
value creating potential of coopetition. 
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Global technology industries are characterized by rapid innovation cycles, convergent 
technologies, and blurred competitive and cooperative boundaries. Firms become embedded in 
complex combinations of relationships to access an increasingly diverse array of value creation 
opportunities. This poses a particularly significant challenge for entrepreneurial firms, who have 
limited resource pools and thus fewer opportunities to identify value creation potential (Bengtsson 
& Johansson, 2014). In this context, the merits of cooperating with competitors — coopetition — 
have received theoretical and empirical support (Gnyawali & Park, 2009:2011; Ritala, 2012). 
Coopetition can lead to superior performance as competitors work together in some areas while 
retaining pressure toward improvements in others (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000).  
There is limited discussion in the literature concerning the viability of a coopetition strategy 
for entrepreneurial firms. The lacuna is notable as entrepreneurial activities are characterized by 
uncertainty (Alvarez, 2007; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) and coopetition has been identified as 
critical in such environments (Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Padula & Dagnino, 2007; Peng et al., 2012; 
Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013). We suggest that cooperating with competitors can be a 
significant source of value creation for entrepreneurial firms. Our paper unpacks insights from the 
capabilities literature (Barney, 1991; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984) to identify 
coopetition as an important source of entrepreneurial rents. It isolates the role of value creation in 
coopetition before considering how it is aligned with the pursuit of entrepreneurial rents. 
Incorporating the resource-based view, dynamic capabilities, and game theory, we illustrate how 
competitors’ resources and capabilities can offer significant value creation opportunities while 
simultaneously reducing both uncertainty and risk.  
 Our paper makes several contributions to theory and policy. First, it highlights coopetition 
as an important source of entrepreneurial rents. We outline benefits such as resource 
complementarities, flexibility, and reductions in uncertainty and risk that entrepreneurial firms can 
achieve through coopetition. Second, we propose novel mechanisms linking coopetition to 
performance including superior knowledge transfer capabilities, managing uncertainties in 
dynamic environments, and reduced opportunistic risks. Our research also underscores previous 
policy contributions that demonstrate the benefits of competitor cooperation, especially between 
small firms in dynamic industries (e.g., Jorde & Teece, 1990). We caution against confusing 
coopetition with collusion and, by reinforcing the value creating nature of coopetition, offer an 
effective means for distinguishing between the two. 
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Coopetition is defined as “the dyadic and paradoxical relationship that emerges when two 
firms cooperate in some activities, such as in a strategic alliance, and at the same time compete 
with each other in other activities” (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000: 412). Cooperation with competitors 
raises the prospect of collusion but, in the context of coopetition, it is no obstacle to free 
competition (cf. Porter & Fuller, 1986; Smith, 1937). That is, coopetition does not involve 
cooperation smothering competition. Rather, the coopetition concept characterizes competitor 
interactions where cooperation occurs in value creating activities and, simultaneously, competition 
occurs to capture the value created. By explicitly linking cooperation to value creation, and 
competition to value capture (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009), we offer a transparent 
distinction between coopetition and collusion. Collusion occurs when competitors cooperate to 
capture value from other stakeholders in ways that restrict free competition. Coopetition, on the 
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other hand, requires cooperation to create additional value — a bigger pie (Brandenburger & 
Nalebuff, 1997) — for competitors to capture their slice through open competitive actions 
(Gnyawali, He, & Madhavan, 2008).  
Although competition and cooperation are interdependent in coopetition (Chen 2002:2008; 
Gnyawali, He, Madhavan, & Bengtsson, 2016), by understanding their fundamentally different 
purposes, we can isolate the processes of value creation and value capture. In coopetition alliances, 
value creation is the core purpose of cooperation between competitors (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; 
Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). We use value creation to illustrate how competitors may 
cooperate to pursue entrepreneurial rents.  
Value creation for entrepreneurial rents 
Entrepreneurial rents are those where the value of the opportunity is uncertain (Alvarez, 
2007; Rumelt, 1987). This contrasts with quasi-rents, where parties make investments to achieve 
a return that is either known or known probabilistically (Alvarez, 2007). Entrepreneurship involves 
making novel connections between means and ends (Kirzner, 1997), necessitating that firms 
combine a steady pipeline of new ideas through opportunity-seeking with precise advantage-
seeking processes for capturing and internalizing value to achieve sustainable superior 
performance (Hitt, Ireland, Camp, & Sexton, 2001; Ireland, Hitt, & Sirmon, 2003; Ketchen, 
Ireland, & Snow, 2007; Zahra, Sapienza, & Davidsson, 2006). While advantage-seeking is 
associated with value capture, our focus is on opportunity-seeking and the cooperative 
combination and organization of unique resources bundles (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001). This is 
analogous to value creation for entrepreneurial rents; the employment of heterogeneous resources 
for the identification and creation of new market opportunities (Ketchen et al., 2007). 
Entrepreneurs are no longer seen as one man armies against the world (Gassenheimer, 
Bacus, & Bacus, 1996); reflected by a diverse body of research that demonstrates the merits of 
collaborative opportunity-seeking (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2006; Gnyawali & Park, 
2009:2011; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Ribeiro-Soriano & Urbano, 2009). Potential 
collaborators include buyers, suppliers, complementors, and competitors (Dowling, Roering, 
Carlin, & Wisnieski., 1996; Shipilov, 2012). In the following sections, we use three theoretical 
lenses to consider partnering with competitors as an approach to generating entrepreneurial rents. 
How entrepreneurial firms can create value through coopetition? A resource based view 
While theories like transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) contribute 
to understanding the cost minimization outcomes of coopetition (Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988; 
Ring & Van de Ven, 1992), we focus on coopetition to create additional value (Alvarez, 2007; 
Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1997; Zajac & Olsen, 1993). Organizing resources is a necessary part 
of value creation and, as such, is a fundamental element of entrepreneurial activity (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2004). The RBV identifies valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources that 
are heterogeneously distributed and not easily tradeable as sources of competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991). As the nature of firm boundaries have become more permeable, necessary 
resources are available through external networks (Garrette, Castañer, & Dussauge, 2009; 
Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Where a firm does not or cannot control all the resources required 
for value creation, its ability to build external relationships, access resources, and create value from 
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shared resources becomes a key source of entrepreneurial rents (Cassiman, di Guardo, & Valentini, 
2009; Garrette et al., 2009; Ketchen et al., 2007). Under this relational view, an effective strategy 
shifts from the static objective of protecting valuable in-house resources to a more dynamic 
resource-sharing and joint development approach (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  
The types of resources with value creation potential are often held by competitors, who are 
already servicing customers in the focal arena (Chetty & Wilson, 2003; Park, Srivastava, & 
Gnyawali, 2014) and confronting similar challenges (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000). 
Coopetition can enable prompt access to strategically relevant resources and reduce the time and 
costs associated with internal development or acquisition (Gnyawali & Park, 2009:2011). In turn, 
this creates new resources that are rare, valuable, inimitable, and non-substitutable through the 
deployment of a more diverse knowledge base and greater reputational capital than a single 
competitor could muster alone (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Hult, Ketchen, & Nichols, 2002). 
Coopetition, as distinct from a non-competitor alliance, allows competitors to retain their market-
facing competitive stance while cooperating to pursue value creation for entrepreneurial rents.  
Cooperation with competitors facilitates the combination of complementary and scarce 
resources, leading to new technologies, products, and services. Moreover, the proximity of 
competitors in market, technological, and resource arenas can reduce the costs associated with 
identifying external complementarities (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998). This is illustrated by the S-
LCD venture, which merged Sony's competencies in televisions with Samsung's expertise in LCD 
technology (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). It led to, among other outcomes, the establishment of LCD-
TVs as the industry standard and a situation whereby the partners’ resource sets are more valuable 
in combination than the sum of their isolated efforts. In an entrepreneurial setting, there will be 
complementarities between the opportunity-seeking skills of small firms and the advantage-
seeking expertise of larger organizations operating in similar areas. When combined, these 
capabilities can facilitate improved value capture and protection by small firms, while fueling 
strategic renewal for their larger partners (Ireland & Webb, 2007; Ireland et al., 2003; Ketchen et 
al., 2007).  
The effectiveness of opportunity-seeking behavior is contingent on the firm’s ability to 
integrate new knowledge with existing knowledge (Ketchen et al., 2007). Knowledge integration 
is a complex cognitive process and the transfer of tacit knowledge is enhanced by close personal 
interaction (Ryan & O’Connor, 2013) and understanding of shared contexts. Similar focuses, in 
terms of markets, technologies, and resources, leads to overlapping dominant logics among 
competitors and high levels of relative absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & 
Lubatkin, 1998). This means that coopetition partners may be uniquely well-equipped to identify, 
assimilate, and apply each other's new and valuable knowledge (Dussauge et al., 2000; Gnyawali 
& Park, 2009). Absorptive capacity eliminates learning barriers (e.g., effort and investment), 
creates transparent lines of communication, and reduces the need to codify tacit knowledge. This 
creates causal ambiguity that prevents imitation and increases the value available for coopetition 
partners (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001).  
Overlapping dominant logics and prior related knowledge also increase the likelihood that 
competitors will share similar beliefs about the value of heterogeneous resource combinations. As 
the value of entrepreneurial rents are not known in advance (Alvarez, 2007; Rumelt, 1987), it is 
the believed value of entrepreneurial opportunities that is important for the initial decision to 
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cooperate (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). The similarity of beliefs 
between competitors is significant in this regard and may lead to an establishment phase that 
requires less effort and investment to coordinate. 
Cooperation with competitors may enable entrepreneurial firms to manage the uncertainty 
associated with entrepreneurial rents. Contrary to risk, where possible outcomes and the 
probability of arriving at those outcomes are known, uncertainty refers to situations where 
outcomes and their probability are unknown (Alvarez, 2007). Concerns surrounding uncertainty 
exist for all entrepreneurial firms as the value of entrepreneurial rents cannot, by definition, be 
known in advance. Inability to predict the realizable future value of entrepreneurial rents is 
particularly challenging for small firms (Alvarez, 2007), whose limited resources mean that they 
have but a few chances to identify an entrepreneurial opportunity that can yield satisfactory quasi-
rents. Motivated by substantially overlapping interests, it means that entrepreneurial firms may 
turn to competitors to pool resources and reduce uncertainty. On one hand, competition enables 
firms to generate carefully crafted offerings that improve over time as customers make real world 
choices among competing alternatives. On the other, cooperation in sharing and combining 
resources allows firms to access a broader resource set and achieve higher levels of specialization. 
Thus, the collaborative pursuit of entrepreneurial rents can achieve a reduction in the net 
uncertainty faced by each firm. 
There are inherent risks associated with combining resources to pursue entrepreneurial 
rents but these may be less in coopetition. Relational performance increases with investments in 
specialized resources (Das, 2005; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Parkhe, 1993). Highly specialized 
resources require high levels of tacit knowledge and embeddedness, and cannot be redirected 
without some loss of productive value (Williamson, 1991). The more specialized an asset set 
becomes, the lower its value in alternative uses and the more exposed the owner becomes to the 
potential risks of hold-up from an opportunistic partner (Dyer, 1997; Williamson, 1991). These 
risks may be lower in coopetition because resource similarity between competitors (Chen, 1996) 
means that investment in specialized assets may require a less significant departure from a firm's 
strategic resource goals. Where highly specific assets must be redirected, competitors facing the 
same exogenous challenges (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Ingram & Qingyuan, 2008) can more easily 
find other purposes for these resources beyond the boundaries of the alliance. In this way, 
coopetition can improve the gross value creation potential of partners by sharing and reconfiguring 
existing resources, while simultaneously achieving a net reduction in both uncertainty and risk. 
A dynamic capabilities perspective 
Dynamic capabilities “can be harnessed to continuously create, extend, upgrade, protect, 
and keep relevant the enterprise’s unique asset base” (Teece, 2007: 1319) in rapidly changing 
environments. As an extension of the resource-based view, it accounts for the dynamic nature of 
competitive advantage (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007) and entrepreneurial creativity in 
the organization of resources (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Barney, 2001). Dynamic capabilities 
alter the firm’s resource set by sensing changing requirements, reconfiguring capabilities, and 
transforming resources and routines based on experience. They are particularly relevant in 
uncertain, non-linear, and discontinuous contexts (Ambrosini, Bowman, & Collier, 2009), moving 
beyond learning from experience (Winter, 2003) to incorporate the imaginative and creative skills 
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of the entrepreneur – both in the identification of new opportunities and the creation of new 
resource sets. 
In an entrepreneurial context, dynamic capabilities are relevant because value creation 
decisions are often made without a clear idea of the scale of the opportunity or the potential payoff 
(Alvarez, 2007; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). Entrepreneurship is about “cognition, discovery, 
pursuing market opportunities, and coordinating knowledge that lead to heterogeneous outputs” 
(Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001: 757). This describes a fundamentally iterative process, where the 
sources of sustainable competitive advantage are not inimitable resources themselves, but the 
capabilities to adapt and improve these resources to meet a constantly evolving set of challenges 
(Teece et al., 1997). When facing this type of uncertainty, capabilities to pivot rapidly, and revise 
routines and processes, are highly significant (March, 1991). Entrepreneurial firms can use 
coopetition alliances to learn from evolution, adaption, and replication. Accessing competitors’ 
knowledge and resources to pursue entrepreneurial rents stimulates entrepreneurial orientation, 
keeps ordinary capabilities flexible (Zahra et al., 2006), and determines the effectiveness of its 
opportunity-seeking (e.g., Teece, 2007:2014).  
Game theory 
Game theory can be used to illustrate how the fates of individual competitors are 
intertwined with that of their ecosystems (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1997). It suggests that the 
risks of opportunism in coopetition (e.g., Park & Russo, 1996) may be overstated and coopetition 
can yield superior value creation opportunities. Through the Prisoner's Dilemma model, we can 
understand that, even in a fixed-sum environment, firms can reduce available payoffs by overly 
aggressive or opportunistic acts (Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco, 2004; Ritala & 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009).  Prisoner's Dilemma reflects the hypothetical choices available to 
a partnership of captured robbers being questioned independently. Each must choose to either 
defect from their robbing partnership by opportunistically 'squealing' on the other or to continue 
to cooperate and tell the police nothing. The most desirable outcomes for each party are Unilateral 
Defection>Mutual Cooperation>Mutual Defection>Unilateral Cooperation. Similarly, alliance 
research asserts that one partner acting opportunistically can capture the largest individual reward 
(total value minus what is destructed from the erosion of trust, goodwill, and cooperation). 
However, though cooperation generates a slightly smaller individual benefit to both firms, the 
largest total payoff is preserved.  
Game theory also illustrates how cooperation may be optimal at the firm-level when 
repeated interactions are likely. Where there are repeated engagements, opportunistic firms are 
ultimately deleted because their behavior eliminates future opportunities to cooperate with other 
actors, incites retaliation, intensifies future rivalry (Axelrod, 1984), and ruins the firm’s reputation 
in areas beyond the alliance (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000; Hill, 1990). These outcomes raise 
costs while precluding future access to collaborative pursuits of entrepreneurial rents. Where 
entrepreneurial firms place sufficient value on future transactions, cooperation in some areas can 
offer optimal returns (Axelrod, 1984).  
In addition, game theory highlights how cooperation between competitors can lead to 
superior and positive-sum value creation where available (Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco, 
2004). This is illustrated by the Stag Hunt game; two hunters can work independently to each catch 
 6 
 
a hare, or collaborate to catch a deer. Naturally, a deer represents a bigger coup than two hares 
and, in the same vein, coopetition presents opportunities for competitors to combine 
complementary and homogeneous resources and pursue larger projects than either could manage 
independently (Garrette et al., 2009; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). In 2001, for 
instance, Astrium and TAS, two European satellite manufacturers, cooperated to design and build 
a new European orbital platform with capabilities to support extremely powerful 
telecommunications satellites and compete with top-of-the-range American manufacturers. This 
was a project that neither firm could have achieved alone (Fernandez, Le Roy, & Gnyawali, 2014). 
DISCUSSION 
Cooperation is critical for achieving entrepreneurial goals (Ketchen et al., 2007; Teng, 
2007).  Drawing from the resource-based view, dynamic capabilities perspective, and game theory, 
we illuminate how competitors may be the most suitable partners when pursuing value creation 
activities focused on entrepreneurial rents. Cooperation with competitors facilitates access to 
strategically relevant and complementary resources that require less effort and investment to 
recognize, assimilate, and apply. Coopetition can also reduce the entrepreneurial uncertainty faced 
by each firm and limit the risks of high resource specificity. Dynamic capabilities necessary for 
firms to identify and create value from coopetition partners’ innovation processes can enable firms 
to reform routines, and pivot in rapidly evolving environments. Additionally, game theory 
illustrates how opportunistic risks may be reduced and coopetition can enable firms to pursue value 
creation outcomes that a single firm could not manage alone. 
 Our paper makes three contributions. First, we demonstrate how entrepreneurial firms can 
access valuable and relevant resources by partnering with their competitors. The entrepreneurship 
literature has traditionally considered how entrepreneurial activities are organized inside the firm 
(Covin & Slevin, 1991; Miller, 1983; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) but globalization, 
technological advancements, and the evolving complexity of networks have brought an emerging 
acknowledgment that firms will not own or control all the resources they require. The benefits of 
coopetition that we highlight include resource complementarities, flexibility, and reductions in 
uncertainty and risk. We build our insights from highly influential economic theories; meaning 
that our theorizing is well-grounded and, in many cases, sophisticated empirical constructs are 
already available for testing our work. Second, we highlight novel ways in which cooperation with 
competitors can contribute to firm performance. Our paper suggests that coopetition can generate 
benefits such as the efficient transfer of tacit knowledge, reduced uncertainties from the pursuit of 
entrepreneurial rents, and decreases in the risks of hold-up and knowledge misappropriation. This 
builds on previous conceptual work in this area (e.g., Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Ritala & 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009) and advances our understanding of coopetition performance. 
Third, our research can inform antitrust policy. We highlight value creation benefits available from 
competitor cooperation for entrepreneurial firms in dynamic industries (e.g., Jorde & Teece, 1990). 
By reinforcing the value creation focus of coopetition, we offer an effective means for 
distinguishing between cooperation and collusion. 
There are exciting opportunities to verify and extend our work. We adopt a traditional 
approach to entrepreneurship, whereby the identification of an opportunity occurs prior to the 
organization of resources. However, it would also be interesting to examine coopetition from the 
opposite perspective — where entrepreneurship begins with available resources and proceeds to 
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opportunity identification (Sarasvathy, 2001). This viewpoint can unearth further opportunities for 
superior value creation by accessing competitors’ resources and capabilities. The logic driving the 
relevance of competitors’ assets will be similar, but an effectuation approach will position 
coopetition as the source of entrepreneurial opportunity, rather than the means for achieving it. 
The research path we have opened must also be balanced by simultaneous consideration of 
the value capture processes employed by entrepreneurial firms. To differentiate between 
coopetition and collusion, our conceptualization posits that value creation is undertaken 
collaboratively, while value capture activities are pursued individually. We examine how firms 
can discover value, but we do not consider critical appropriation processes that are necessary for 
harvesting these discoveries (Ketchen et al., 2007). When entering an alliance with a competitor, 
fundamental risks remain concerning their capabilities to erode existing advantages, even in areas 
unrelated to the entrepreneurial venture. These threats are particularly apparent when bargaining 
power is distributed asymmetrically (Shipilov, 2009), such as when smaller firms are partnering 
with larger ones (Bengtsson & Johansson, 2014). Therefore, if coopetition is to be sustainable for 
entrepreneurial firms, future research is required to consider how entrepreneurial competitors 
manage value capture activities, as well as how they simultaneously balance value capture with 
value creation (Alvarez & Barney, 2004; Ketchen et al., 2007).  
Lastly, the firm’s approach to interacting with partners is a key determinant of alliance 
outcomes (Franco & Haase, 2013; Launsbury, 1998). Therefore, a complementary approach to 
ours will consider how entrepreneurial firms create value through coopetition. Entrepreneurial 
firms identify and create opportunities at a faster rate (Zahra et al., 2006) but their proactivity and 
aggressiveness may be destabilizing for an alliance. We encourage inquiries using established 
dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Miller, 1983). Empirical 
scrutiny in this area is necessary to develop a holistic understanding of coopetition as a source of 
value creation for entrepreneurial firms.  
In summary, our paper lays out opportunities for firms to use coopetition as a vehicle to 
pursue entrepreneurial rents. We hope that scholars can build on the insights we put forward and 
further advance this intriguing line of research. 
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